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Nobody Expects the Spanish Inquisition:
A Primer on the Use (and Abuse) of Ex
Pane Proceedings in Civil Cases
ROBERT J. CURRIE*
I. INTRODUCTION
On any ex parte application, the utmost good faith must be observed. That requires
full and frank disclosure of all material facts known to the applicant or counsel
that could reasonably be expected to have a bearing on the outcome of the
application. Because counsel for the applicant is asking the judge to invoke a
procedure that runs counter to the fundamental principle of justice that all sides
of a dispute should be heard, counsel is under a super-added duty to the court and
other parties to ensure that as balanced a consideration of the issue is undertaken
as is consonant with the circumstances.

Canadian Paraplegic Association (Newfoundland and Labrador) Inc. v.
Sparcott Engineering Ltd. '
CARDINAL XIMINEZ: NOBODY expects the Spanish Inquisition! Our chief
weapon is surprise . . . surprise and fear.. . fear and surprise... Our two weapons
are fear and surprise . . . and ruthless efficiency . . .

M. Python, "The Spanish Inquisition"
* Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, Member of the Bar of Nova Scotia. A version of
this paper was presented to the Canadian Bar Association Canadian Legal Conference,
"Winning Advocacy Skills" CLE Session (August 14,2006). I would like to acknowledge
the outstanding research assistance, as well as the historical and interpretive insights, which
were provided by Gillian MacNeil (LL.B. Dalhousie 2006, LL.M. Cambridge 2008) towards the original preparation of this paper, as well as the stalwart research support provided
by Jim Janson (LL.B. Dalhousie 2010, expected) in updating it for publication. Thanks are
also due to my colleagues Elizabeth Hughes, Rollie Thompson and Philip Girard, as well
as to Justice Tom Cromwell, Justice David Russell, Jim Rossiter, Paul McLean and Rick
Southcott; the usual caveat about limitations and errors applies.
1 (1997), [1997] N.J. No. 122, 1997 CarswellNfld 275 (C.A.), per Green J.A. at para. 18.
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As the passages quoted above suggest, the use of ex pane proceedings
(also called, more simply, proceedings "without notice") by litigants is a matter
of concern to courts, clients and even the public. Even the most uninterested
lay person can, if called upon, generally come up with some version of the idea
that "everyone is entitled to their day in court" and would be surprised to learn
that a party's rights can be affected, even truncated, via court proceedings at
which they were not even given the opportunity to appear or be represented.
"That is not right," our lay person would say, and in one sense they would be
correct. The idea that the force of the law, whether civil or criminal, can be
brought to bear upon a person in their absence, and without notice and an
opportunity to be heard, is abhorrent to the traditions of the common law. It
invokes frightful images, from Kafka's The Trial to the excesses and abuses of
the Star Chamber—and, of course, the Spanish Inquisition.2
And yet, as we know, in some ways our lay person would be incorrect,
since ex pane proceedings are "right" mostly because there are situations where
the administration of justice cannot be done (or be done efficiently) without
them. While antithetical to the adversarial nature of our legal system and viewed
with deep misgiving by courts, they are nonetheless an appropriate and necessary mechanism by which litigation operates. Criminal search warrants are
issued ex pane—as they must be, since the target would no doubt abscond with
the evidence if he had notice.3 Anton Filler orders and Mareva injunctions
operate similarly. Other kinds of interlocutory applications proceed on an ex
pane basis because there is no one to whom notice may be given, or no one
whose interests require it. Recently, and controversially, the government of
Canada has begun to use ex pane proceedings against certain persons implicated
in terrorism activities, justifying this use as being in the interests of national
security.4 Yet judging when and how to utilize ex pane proceedings can be a
complex exercise, with traps for the unwary, the well-seasoned and the inexperienced alike.
Flowery introductory comments aside, the goal here is fairly modest: to
provide litigation counsel with a general overview of the law, ethics and procedure relating to ex pane proceedings in civil proceedings, along with suggestions for appropriate and successful practice in this setting. While there is
2 To be perfectly fair, the Spanish Inquisition was an ecclesiastical court that operated on
continental Europe, and European legal systems were often more comfortable with proceedings in absentia than the common law. Also, persons prosecuted by the Inquisition
were entitled, and in fact compelled, to be present for their trials (and their burning
thereafter). However, the historical record bears out that, by the time one was arrested by
the Inquisition, a legal fait accompli had been instituted in his/her absence—not least
because the individual's property was generally seized at the time of arrest. See generally
J. Perez, The Spanish Inquisition: A History (J. Lloyd trans.) (New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press, 2005).
3 Maclntyre v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (1982), 132 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.).
4 See Charkaoui, Re, 2008 SCC 38; Canada (Attorney General) v. Khawaja, 2007 FCA 388,
leave to appeal refused (2008), 2008 CarswellNat 756, 2008 CarswellNat 755 (S.C.C.).
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no shortage of excellent Canadian periodical literature on certain kinds of ex
pane proceedings, one searches in vain for a simple survey piece that lays out
the nature and basic features; the leading text from which civil procedure courses
are taught at Canadian law schools devotes only a few lines to the matter.51
hope this paper will at least begin to fill that gap, and prove useful in helping
to avoid the pitfalls that come with this territory.

II. OVERVIEW
To firmly locate the discussion, use of the terms "ex pane" or "without
notice" proceedings refers to hearings (usually interlocutory) before courts or
tribunals, as part of either ongoing or anticipated litigation, which are held in
the presence of only one party and without notice to the other(s). As it was put
by Justice Cattanach:6
The Latin words ex pane, translated literally mean from one side or party only
and in a legal sense mean a proceeding that is taken or granted at the instance of
and for the benefit of one party only without notice to or contestation by any
person adversely interested.
My search for accounts of the historical development of the ex pane
proceeding as we know it today has not turned up any simple, linear explanation.
It seems that, throughout the history of English law, there have been many kinds
of ex parte mechanisms, each with its own purpose and history. For example,
the application for default judgment, a "classic" use for an ex parte proceeding,
can be traced to pre-Norman times.7 On the other hand, prior to the reign of
Henry II the phrase was used to describe situations where title to land had been
challenged and the original vendor was permitted to stand in for the landowner
where the latter was absent from the country8—the kind of practice that likely
developed into ex parte meaning "on behalf of."9 Certainly by the time of the
5 J. Walker, General Ed., The Civil Litigation Process: Cases and Materials, 6th ed. (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery, 2005) at 615. For more comprehensive treatment see Linda S.Abrams
and Kevin P. McGuiness, Canadian Civil Procedure Law (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis,
2008) at pages 480-486 and 1166.
6 Manitoba (Attorney General) v. Canada (National Energy Board), [ 1974] 2 F.C. 502 (Fed.
T.D.) at para. 45. See also Hover v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (1999), 46 C.P.C.
(4th) 213 (Alta. C.A.): ". . .the defining element of an ex pane order is the absence of
notice to the other party" (at para. 22, per Fruman J.A.).
7 Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol. II (London: Methuen & Co.,
1903), at 102-103.
8 E. Jenks, A Short History of English Law (London: Methuen & Co., 1928) at 49-50.
9 This definition was still on the books, at least, into the 20th century, and is still used in
British practice: W. Mack, Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, Vol. XVIII (New York:
American Law Book Co., 1905).
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Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, ex parte practice was well-developed,
as the legislature was compelled to include rules to govern its use. It appears
that at this point the phrase was firmly in place as a reference to legal proceedings
which were "one-sided."10
Perhaps a better starting point for understanding ex parte proceedings is
to examine their place within our adversarial system of justice. The common
law, of course, puts great faith in the ability of a system of zealous advocacy
by competing parties as the most superior means of producing sound legal
results." As advocates and decision-makers alike, we trust the adversarial system and we view with suspicion anything that would tend to undermine it.
Naturally, allowing a situation where a party to a proceeding is not before the
court to put forward its position is in fundamental opposition to our bedrock
notions, particularly in any situation where the rights or interests of the missing
party are likely to be affected. The court is intended to be an impartial arbiter;
it cannot effectively step into the missing party's shoes and represent it, nor can
it properly assess the missing party's position in a vacuum.
Accordingly, as the adversarial system developed it was quick to embrace
an even older principle, one that both supported the functioning of the adversarial system and imposed procedural fairness. This principle is usually referred
to by way of the Latin phrase audi alterant partem, and has been defined as
follows: l2
It is one of the first principles in the administration of justice that the tribunal
which is to decide must hear both sides and give both an opportunity of hearing
the evidence upon which the decision is to turn... I find the master minds of every
century are consentaneous in holding it to be an indispensable requirement of
justice that the party who is to decide shall hear both sides giving each an
opportunity of hearing what is urged against him.

As Justice Pugsley points out, this "rule of elementary justice"13 has an
"impressive ancestry" that well predates the common law: l4
10 The phrase therefore also captures the idea of "ex parte communications," i.e., communication between a party and a judge outside a formal hearing.
11 "The diligence of the parties in ferreting out evidence favourable to their side and the
vigour with which they attack their opponent's case are seen by many as finer guarantees
of approximating the historical truth than giving the problem for resolution to some
government official whose motivation can rarely be of the magnitude of the parties." (R.
Delisle et al., Evidence: Principles & Problems, 8th ed. (Toronto: Thomson/Carswell,
2007), at 4).
12 Brook, Delcomyn & Badart, Re (1864), 16 C.B.N.S. 403 (C.P.) at p. 416, as quoted in
Dominion Canners Ltd. v. Costanza (1922), [1923] S.C.R. 46, per Anglin J.
13 Dominion Canners, ibid.
14 Gaston v. Burton (1998), (sub nom. Burton v. Howlett) 172 N.S.R. (2d) 342, [1998] N.S.J.
No. 487 (C.A.) at paragraph 53, quoting DeSmith.Woolf & Jowell, Judicial Review of
Administrative Action, 5th ed. (1995, Sweet & Maxwell). The relevant passage from
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That no man is to be judged unheard was a precept known to Greeks, inscribed
in ancient times upon images in places where justice was administered, proclaimed
in Seneca's Medea, enshrined in the scriptures, mentioned by St. Augustine,
embodied in Germanic as well as African proverbs, ascribed in the Year Books
to the law of nature, asserted by Coke to be a principle of divine justice, and
traced by an eighteenth-century judge to the events in the Garden of Eden.

Canadian case law is clear that where exparte proceedings are permitted
by rules, statutes or practice, they operate for the most part as an exception to
the audi alteram partem rule. Parties are "judged," in the sense that their rights,
obligations and entitlements are determined and affected, without being heard
by the court. The moving party enjoys a prima facie unfair advantage, its
advocacy unhindered by an adversary. This in turn imposes certain duties upon
the moving party, which are further explored below.
To be sure, as mentioned above, various kinds of ex pane proceedings
are available in every jurisdiction, as they are necessary to the efficient administration of justice and, properly conducted, represent an acceptable compromise. Yet exparte hearings remain the exception, rather than the rule. Judicial
discomfort with processes inconsistent with the audi alteram principle is expressed clearly and often. The principle, after all, is one of ensuring fairness,
and thus the ex pane hearing starts off as presumptively unfair since "the
ordinary checks and balances of the adversarial system are not operative."15 No
one is there to meet the moving party's arguments, nor to cross-examine its
witnesses and otherwise test its evidence.16 The court is essentially being asked
to make a decision in the dark. As Justice Sharpe (as he then was) stated in
United States v. Friedland, "[t]he Judge hearing an ex parte motion and the
absent party are literally at the mercy of the party seeking... relief... The
situation is rife with the danger that an injustice will be done to the absent
party."17
The courts, then, at least ideally, will proceed with caution in ex parte
matters, since judicial comity entails that an order made by one level of court
will have the respect of other judges of that court18 and benefit from the appli-

15
16
17
18

Seneca's Medea, "Quicunque aliquid statuerit, parte inaudita altera, Aequum licet statuerit, haud aequus fuit," shows up frequently in the case law even into the modern day.
For a recent example, see Brown v. DML Resources Pty Ltd., [2001 ] NSWSC 250 (S.C.)
at para. 46.
United States v. Friedland (1996), [1996] O.J. No. 4399, 1996 CarswellOnt 5566 (Gen.
Div.) at para. 26.
Antonio F. Azevedo, "The Duty to Disclose on Motions Without Notice for Injunctive
Relief (2000) 23 Adv. Q. 499, at 499.
Friedland, supra note 15 at para. 26.
Indian Manufacturing Ltd. v. Lo (1996), 110 F.T.R. 201 (T.D.) at 206, reversed (1997),
75 C.P.R. (3d) 338 (Fed. C.A.), cited in D. Drapeau and M. Drapeau, "The Taming of
John Doe Orders by the Federal Court of Canada" (2000-2001) 17 Cdn. Intellectual Prop.
Rev. 545, at 559.
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cable standard of review at the appellate level. Procedurally, the scope for
attacking ex pane orders is sometimes made "much wider... than would be
permitted only by way of appeal."19 The ability to initiate ex pane proceedings
is also restrictively managed, as will be discussed in the next section.
The next part of this paper will examine the availability of ex pane
proceedings and restrictions thereon. As a paper of this length cannot hope to
be comprehensive, the focus will be mostly upon practice in civil proceedings
before provincial superior courts, since this arguably is the most broadly-based,
and thus illustrative, forum. It should be remembered, however, that ex pane
proceedings are employed in some manner by every level of court, including
provincial courts, appellate courts, family courts, etc., and inquiries should be
made into the case law of each jurisdiction for local specifics. The principles
underpinning ex pane practice, however, are broadly the same, as will be
illustrated by the examples used below.

III. WHEN CAN EX PARTE MOTIONS BE MADE?
The use of the word "motions" in the title of this section is deliberate, as
ex parte proceedings are virtually always interlocutory in nature. Most often
they are employed to serve the usual purposes of interlocutory proceedings, i.e.,
to solve problems encountered in ongoing litigation, usually by enforcement of
procedural rules. Some types of ex parte motions simply move the litigation
along (e.g., applications for substituted service, motions for leave to renew an
originating notice), and will result in interlocutory orders. Others, such as a
motion for default judgment, can have a dispositive effect and produce "final"
orders in the sense that they "have a terminating effect on an issue or on the
exposure of a party,"20 though they are still made on an interlocutory basis.
The most obvious answer to the question in the title, of course, is that ex
parte applications can be made wherever the procedural rules, applicable statutes, common law or even local practices dictate that they can be made. It is
possible to break these occasions down into three categories, though there is
inevitably some overlap between the categories due to the nature of the order
sought or the peculiarities of the local rules of court. These categories will be
outlined below, following which the point will be made that even where an ex
parte motion is explicitly permitted by a rule or enactment, courts will sometimes short-circuit that route in the interests of fairness.

19 Rolling Stone Haulage Ltd. v. Wilkinson, Tyrell, McKay Insurance Brokers & Consultants
Lfcf.(1997),[1997]O.J.No.4018,1997 CarswellOnt 5371 (Div. Ct.) at para. 12, referring
to Rule 37.14(1) of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure.
20 J. Sopinka, M. Gelowitz, The Conduct of an Appeal (Toronto: Butterworths, 1993) at p.
6.
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1. Ex Parte Motions under the General Authority of the Rules
The procedural rules of every jurisdiction in the country contain general
provisions, in some form, regarding when ex parte motions will be permitted
(see Appendix below). The provincial and territorial rules are broadly similar;
while there are local differences in the wording, these are generally not significant.21 For example, R. 387(1) of Alberta's Rules of Court states: "If satisfied
that no notice is necessary or that the delay caused by proceeding by notice of
motion might entail serious mischief, the Court may make an order ex parte."
In Ontario, R. 37.07 provides in part: "(2) Where the nature of the motion or
the circumstances render service of the notice of motion impracticable or unnecessary, the court may make an order without notice; (3) Where the delay
necessary to effect service might entail serious consequences, the court may
make an interim order without notice."
Newfoundland's Rule 29.04 states:
29.04. (1) An application may be made ex parte where
(a) under a statute or rule, notice is not required;
(b) the application is made before any party is served;
(c) the applicant is the only party;
(d) the application is made during the course of a trial or hearing; or
(e) the Court is satisfied that the delay caused by giving notice would
or might entail serious mischief, or that notice is not necessary.

As might be expected, the courts always maintain jurisdiction to direct
that notice be given or provide other relief, including dismissal of the motion,
in any situation where the judge finds that notice ought to have been given.22
What can be observed is that similar concerns appear to underpin the
restrictions on the use of ex parte motions. Most of the rules speak to situations
where notice is "unnecessary" or "impracticable," and more importantly where
either notice itself or the delay that it would cause would entail "serious mischief," "serious consequences" or "injustice," often explicitly or implicitly
importing the idea of "urgency." The goal is clearly to provide a tool that is
flexible enough to cover a variety of situations while not being open to abuse.23
21 For example, Saskatchewan's Rule 441(3) is similar to other provincial superior court
rules which provide a "blanket" authorization for ex parte motions, but unlike every other
set of rules does not specifically authorize it when the court deems notice to be "unnecessary." However, other provisions specifically provide for ex parte motions where the
drafters clearly deemed notice to be unnecessary, so this is slightly more restrictive if at
all.
22 See Ontario Rule 37.07(5); BC Rule 52( 12).
23 I owe this observation to Gillian MacNeil.
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This general, "blanket" authorization for ex parte motions is usually
restrictively interpreted by the courts. Naturally, there are several situations
where notice is actually "unnecessary." A good example is the application for
substituted service, where the plaintiff is permitted to apply ex parte for an
order allowing her to constructively serve the defendant via a court-approved
alternative to personal service. No notice is required, an exception to audi
alteram which is highly justifiable as a last-ditch attempt to ensure the defendant
actually has the opportunity to be heard in the proceeding—or because the
defendant is evading the court's process.24
Such situations where notice is unnecessary are common enough, and the
logic behind dispensing with notice for these matters usually means that the
rule authorizing the motion explicitly allows for it to be made ex parte, putting
them more in the second category below. There are exceptions, a notable one
in some jurisdictions being found in provisions that provide for discovery to
take place prior to the larger action commencing.25 A good example is the Nova
Scotia case of Leahy v. B. (A.),26 where the identity of a potential defendant to
a defamation suit was known to a third party who refused to divulge his identity
to Leahy, the potential plaintiff. Nova Scotia Rule 18.12(2) (then R. 18.02(c))27
provides for discovery prior to the commencement of a proceeding, and Leahy
was permitted to obtain an ex parte discovery order for the third party even
though the Rule did not expressly provide for it.28
A provision that does not explicitly require notice will not always be read
as implicitly permitting an ex parte motion, however. A good example of this
issue came up in Burton v. Howlett.29 In that case, the plaintiff had served the
defendant's husband with a discovery notice and, when the husband did not
appear for discovery, applied ex parte for, and received, an order directing the
husband to appear for discovery and to pay the costs of both the aborted
24 See also Cherubim Metal Works Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2008 NSSC 284
(S.C.) where the Court held that a party was not required to give notice of an application
to obtain an extra-provincial subpoena.
25 Authorization for pre-action discovery is found either in specific civil procedure rules (in
those provinces which have a reception date that is before the development of equitable
pre-action discovery in English law) or in the inherent jurisdiction of the court (those
provinces with later reception dates or where specifically provided for). For good accounts,
see Glaxo Wellcome pic v. Minister of National Revenue (1998), 162 D.L.R. (4th) 433
(Fed. C.A.), leave to appeal refused (1998), 1998 CarswellNat 3296 (S.C.C.) and R. Block
et al., "Sealed Ex Parte Norwich Orders: Safeguarding Against Abuse of the Pre-Action
Disclosure Remedy" in Todd L. Archibald and Michael Cochrane, eds., Annual Review
of Civil Litigation, 2003 (Toronto: Carswell, 2004) 225 at 227-230. See also the discussion
of Norwich orders, below.
26 (1992), 113 N.S.R. (2d) 417 (T.D.).
27 Nova Scotia's new Civil Procedure Rules came into effect on 1 January 2009.
28 It is not entirely clear in the case report that this was an ex parte application, but the lack
of responding counsel and the fact that the third party resided in the U.S. does create this
impression.
29 Supra note 14.
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discovery and the ex pane application. On appeal of the husband's application
to set aside the ex parte order, the plaintiff pointed to what was then Rule
37.04(1 )(a) (which was identical to Newfoundland's Rule 29.04(1 )(a), set out
above) which allows ex pane applications where "under an enactment or rule,
notice is not required." Since the rule under which the ex parte order was issued
(what was then NS Rule 18.15) did not require notice, the plaintiff argued that
none had been required.
The Court of Appeal was not convinced by this argument. Citing audi
alterant as the guiding principle, Justice Pugsley stated: "I interpret CPR
37.04(1 )(a) as impliedly stipulating that notice should always be given to a
person who may be affected by any proceeding directed against him, or her."30
Despite the wording on the face of the Rule, the Court of Appeal was convinced31
that a rule or enactment which is silent as to notice does not imply that no notice
need be given; rather, unless the Rule actually states that the motion may be
made ex parte, or unless circumstances of urgency exist, the presumption is that
notice is required.32 These decisions confirm that the audi alteram principle is
an overarching one which will be applied in such a way as to strictly confine
the availability of ex parte proceedings to cases where they are demonstrably
necessary.
It is easy enough to conjure up situations which can be characterized as
"urgent"33 but courts often require something in the way of an emergency to
convince them that an ex parte order is necessary and appropriate.34 As was
stated in the oft-cited Gulf Islands case, "[t]he first inquiry to be made in all
cases is—'Why did you not give notice?'—and if the answer elicited does not
reveal extraordinary urgency, the application must be refused."35 The urgency
must generally be "so great that it would be impracticable to give notice."36
There will be cases where there is such urgency—certain family matters and
child protection proceedings come to mind—where notice will be "impracticable," but these will likely be few and far between. Given court antipathy to
ex pane proceedings to begin with, the motto "short notice may be better than
30 Ibid, at para. 45.
31 As it clarified shortly after in Society of Lloyd's v. Van Snick (2000), [2000] N.S.J. No.
213, 2000 CarswellNS 189 (C.A.).
32 Ibid, at para. 20. Accord, see Canadian Paraplegic Assn. (Newfoundland & Labrador)
Inc. v. Sparcott Engineering Ltd., supra note 1, per Green J.A. at para. 9.
33 In fact, the new Nova Scotia Rule 22.03(2) provides examples of "circumstances of
sufficient gravity to justify an ex pane motion."
34 E.g., Canadian Urban Equities Ltd. v. Direct Action for Life (1990), 73 Alta. L.R. (2d)
367 (Q.B.) at 377.
35 Gulf Islands Navigation Ltd. v. Seafarers' International Union of North America (Canadian District) (1959), 18 D.L.R. (2d) 216 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 3, affirmed (1959), 18
D.L.R. (2d) 625 (B.C. C.A.). See also British Columbia (Public Trustee) v. Batiuk (1996),
[1996] B.C.J. No. 1646, 1996 CarswellBC 1701 (S.C.) at para. 12, additional reasons at
(1996), 1996 CarswellBC 1914 (S.C.).
36 Leung v. Leung (1993), 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 314 (S.C.) at para. 7.
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none" is a useful starting point.37 As noted in the rules cited above, a certain
type of urgency is created by situations where the giving of notice may, itself,
defeat the purposes of the order38 and entail "mischief or "serious consequences." In these situations, an ex pane motion will be justified; a good
example is an application for an order for interim recovery of personal property.
As explored below, ex pane seeking of Mareva injunctions and similar relief
are also usually justified along this line.
In the Federal Court, the court's jurisdiction to entertain ex pane proceedings is more closely circumscribed than in the provincial and territorial
rules. The Federal Court Rules speak to various kinds of ex pane motions which
can be made, such as substituted service,39 default orders,40 etc., and the federal
statutes which the Court administers also contain similar procedural provisions.
However, there is no "blanket" provision in the Rules allowing the court the
kinds of discretion provided for in the provincial rules. The closest thing to
such a provision is Rule 362(2), which provides some relaxation of the two
days' notice requirement in 362(1): "The Court may hear a motion referred to
in subsection (1) on less than two days notice... (b) in any case, if the moving
party satisfies the Court of the urgency of the motion." The provision is not a
high-traffic one and is used mostly to abridge the notice period for motions,
rather than remove it entirely.41
2. Ex Porte Motions Specifically Provided for in the Rules
As noted above, various rules and statutes provide explicitly that certain
motions may be made on an ex pane basis. These can usually be understood to
reflect the conviction of the legislator or courts that the kind of matter dealt
with is indeed one where notice is "unnecessary" or "impracticable," to the
point where the rule should anticipate and reflect this. Many of these are
procedural mechanisms available to plaintiffs, designed basically to keep litigation moving.
The logic behind making certain kinds of motions ex. pane is reasonably
inescapable, a good example of which is the motion for substituted service, as
described above. Similarly, most jurisdictions provide that applications for leave
to effect extra-judicial service may be made ex pane—likely on the logic that
since notice is not required to a defendant who is about to be served domestically,
37 On this point, see Wendy IWatheson, 'The Law of Injunctions: ExParte Injunctions" OBA
Civil Litigation (2001) online: <http://www.torys.com/Publications/Documents/Publication%20PDFs/AR2001 - 14T.pdf >.
38 See Launch! Research & Development Inc. v. Essex Distributing Co. (1977), [1977] O.J.
No. 1451, 1977 CarswellOnt 275 (H.C.) at para. 5, and Cherubini, supra note 24.
39 Federal Court Rule 136.
40 Federal Court Rule 210.
41 Though see Fontaine v. Canada (Minister of National Defence) (1990), 44 F.T.R. 266
(T.D.).
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there is no compelling need to give notice to a foreign defendant simply on the
basis that the courts should supervise this procedural route. As well, provisions
which provide for the renewal of the originating notice or writ on an ex pane
basis do not attract controversy, as is the case under British practice as well.42
Another good example is the motion for default judgment. Alberta Rule
152, for example, provides:
If a sole defendant has, or all the defendants have, been noted in default, the
plaintiff may
(a) apply ex parte to the court for judgment, and the judge hearing the
application may
(i)

upon proof of the plaintiff s claim by affidavit or otherwise, give
final judgment or direct an accounting, or

(ii) set the matter over for a hearing on notice, and notice shall be
given to a defendant in the same manner as hereinafter provided
on assessment, or
(b) set the matter down for assessment, giving at least 10 days notice of
the date set for assessment.

Note that the Court retains the express discretion to convert the ex pane
application into an inter panes one. Also, with this sort of ex parte rule as with
others, the defendant will receive notice of the ex parte order once it is made,
and will have the opportunity to apply to vary it or have it set aside.43 The effect
is to tightly constrain the use of ex parte motions and give the court heavy
supervisory powers over them.
3. Injunctions and Injunctive-type Relief
Injunctions are generally such intrusive remedies that any ex parte use of
them is approached restrictively by the common law and meant to be supervised
carefully by the courts. Nonetheless, it is well-established that in appropriate
circumstances, a party may apply for injunctive and similar relief on an ex pane
basis.44 The approach to allowing an injunction application to proceed without
notice is, unsurprisingly, restrictive. As Justice Sharpe has written:45

42 See J. O'Hare & R. Hill, Civil Litigation, 5th ed. (London: Longman, 1990), at 219-220.
43 E.g., Alberta Rules 158 and 387(2).
44 There is no room here for a detailed exploration of the topic; but the first point of reference
should be R. Sharpe, Injunctions and Specific Performance, looseleaf (Aurora, Ont.:
Canada Law Book) updated to Release No. 16 (November 2008) at para. 2.20-2.50.
45 Ibid, at para. 2.30.
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There are two categories of extraordinary urgency where courts are willing to
order ex parte injunctions. The first is where urgency arises because there is
reason to believe that the defendants, if given notice, will act to frustrate the
process of justice before the motion can be decided... The second is where there
is simply not enough time and/or means to provide notice, where the circumstances are of such exigency that any delay may defeat the plaintiffs claim.

The second of the above categories is really no different than the situations
of extraordinary urgency which might underpin any ex parte application, as
noted above, and a high threshold is imposed. As one decision frames it: 46
This is a distinctly rare circumstance... These orders are made most frequently
in family law disputes where one parent is said to have kidnapped children of the
marriage, or there is an immediate apprehension that serious harm may occur...
Preventing the kidnapping of children is a sufficient reason to deny the most basic
tenets of civil due process. Few other situations will be so.

The first category entails essentially that the purpose of the injunctive or
other relief sought (usually interlocutory and always on an interim basis) would
be frustrated by the very giving of notice, and that this justifies proceeding
without notice. This factor is perhaps more regimented and applied, since it is
a relatively well-known means by which such applications proceed. The two
"classic" settings for ex parte proceedings are the Mareva injunction47 (which
prohibits disposal of assets or their removal from the jurisdiction pending trial)
and the Anton Filler order48 (which directs the named person to allow the
plaintiff access to premises for the purpose of search and seizure). In both cases,
providing notice would defeat the purpose of the application—with Mareva
because notice might cause the defendant to hide or dispose of assets prior to
the hearing of the injunction application; and with Anton Filler because notice
would cause the defendants to dispose of materials to which the plaintiff has
some kind of proprietary claim and/or might want to use as evidence against
the defendant.
The availability of ex parte applications for these kinds of injunctions is
found within every provincial procedural regime, whether under the general
jurisdiction to allow ex parte orders in appropriate circumstances,49 or where

46 Robert Half Canada Inc. v. Jeewan (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 650 (S.C.J.) at paras. 38-40,
additional reasons at (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 3201 (S.C.J.) per Corbett J. See also M.
(S.) v. C. (J.R.) (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 148 (Gen. Div.).
47 Mareva Campania Naviera S.A. v. International Bulkcarriers S.A., [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
509 (C.A.). See generally Sharpe, supra note 44 at para. 2.750 ff.
48 Anton Filler KG v. Manufacturing Process Ltd. (1975), [1976] 1 Ch. 55 (C.A.). See
generally Celanese Canada Inc. v. Murray Demolition Corp., 2006 SCC 36; Sharpe,
supra note 44 at para. 2.1100 ff.
49 E.g., Ontario Rule 37.07(2).
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specific rules have been put in place to allow them.50 In the Federal Court, the
rationale behind allowing the ex pane application is made explicit in Rule
374(1):
A judge may grant an interim injunction on an ex pane motion for a period of
not more than 14 days where the judge is satisfied
(a) in a case of urgency, that no notice is possible; or
(b) that to give notice would defeat the purpose of the motion.

The Federal Court has also been the site of the development of a unique
kind of injuncti ve remedy: the "John Doe" order, also known as a "rolling Anton
Filler" order.51 This is effectively an Anton Filler order which is granted against
a party who is infringing upon rights of the plaintiff (usually intellectual property), but whose identity is unknown to the plaintiff. "As infringers become
known to the plaintiff and served with the John Doe order issued by the court,
they are added as defendants to the proceeding;"52 the infringer has the John
Doe order executed upon its premises, and most usually an interim injunction
prevents the infringer from continuing to deal in the goods which are the subject
of the plaintiffs claim.53 With these injunctions, the rationale for applying ex
parte is twofold: first, because at the time of the application the plaintiff does
not yet know the identity of the infringer, and thus cannot give notice; and
second, to ensure that the infringer does not hide or dispose of the material in
question (the usual rationale for Anton Filler orders).
Another quasi-injunctive mode of relief that may be applied for ex parte
is the Norwich order, an expansion of the equitable pre-trial discovery remedy
discussed above. These orders "provide an applicant the ability to demand
disclosure of full information from wrongdoers or third parties that are mixed
up in the wrongdoing"54 prior to the commencement of an action, and are often
used to support the obtaining of Mareva injunctions and Anton Filler orders.55
While Norwich orders need not necessarily be obtained ex parte, there will be
situations where fraud or wrongdoing on the part of the target is suspected, or
where notice might otherwise frustrate the purpose of obtaining the order. In

50 E.g., New Brunswick Rule 40.03.
51 See generally D. Drapeau, "Anton Filler Orders: The Latest from the Supreme Court, the
Federal Court of Appeal and the Federal Court" (2006) 20 Intellectual Property Journal
39; D. Drapeau, J. Cullen, "Anton Filler Orders and the Federal Court of Canada" (2004)
17 Intellectual Property Journal 301; D. Drapeau and M. Drapeau, supra note 18; G.
Piasetzki, "Ex Parte John Doe Seizure Orders" (1988) 5 Can. Intellectual Prop. Rev. 174.
52 Drapeau and Drapeau, supra note 18 at 545.
53 Ibid, at 546.
54 R. Block et al., supra note 25 at 231.
55 Ibid.
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the prominent case of Alberta Treasury Branches v. Leahy,56 for example, the
Court noted that "[t]o the extent that urgency is required to trigger the rule
[permitting the ex parte application], there is also a fundamental sense of
urgency in matters related to fraud, bribery and dishonesty."57 In that case, the
Court found that there was "sufficient indicia of deception" as well as the strong
possibility that notice would have made tracing and identifying assets much
more difficult, to justify the application being made ex parte.™
4. Even When You Can, You Can't
The foregoing pages have explored various kinds of cases where ex parte
proceedings will be available, at least formally. However, it is important to
emphasize that simple reliance on the wording of a procedural rule, or counsel's
assessment that the facts of her case justify moving forward without notice, will
not always be an effective guide to the judgment call required. It may be useful
to throw out a few examples of situations where the formal availability of an
ex parte application may be a trap for unwary counsel, by way of beginning to
explore the boundaries of where ex parte proceedings are deemed not to be
appropriate by the court:
•

where the other side is represented by counsel, to the knowledge of
the moving party;59

•

where the moving party knows where the respondents, or some of
them, are located;60

•

where the moving party is seeking directions regarding alterations
made to a testator's will and there exist other potential beneficiaries
who should be given notice;61

•

where the respondent's counsel had anticipated the application, and
informed the moving party's counsel that he was intending to oppose
it and requested notice.62

56 (2000), 270 A.R. 1 (Q.B.), affirmed (2002), 303 A.R. 63 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused
(2002), 303 N.R. 392 (note) (S.C.C.).
57 Ibid, at para. 172.
58 Ibid, and see paras. 164-178.
59 John Doe v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. (1993), [1994] 2 W.W.R. 666 (B.C. S.C.);
Launch! Research & Development Inc. v. Essex Distributing Co. (1977), [1977] O.J. No.
1451, 1977 CarswellOnt 275 (H.C.) at para. 5.
60 Kalogiany v. Rush (1994), [1994] O.J. No. 1560, 1994 CarswellOnt 882 (Gen. Div.) at
para. 13.
61 Verville Estate, Re, 2002 SKQB 355 (Q.B.) at para. 10.
62 Canadian Paraplegic, supra note 1.

Ex Parte Proceedings in Civil Cases 1457
These few examples may help to provide some support for a point which
one rarely sees recorded in literature or case law, but which anecdotally is wellknown to the litigation bar: Generally speaking, the judicial attitude to ex pane
proceedings can only be described, with the greatest of respect, as "antsy." Even
in matters where a motion without notice is procedurally appropriate and factually justified, one hears frequently that judges and masters will nonetheless
adjourn a Chambers hearing, or "simply... refuse to make the order and give
oral directions that notice be given."63
The force of the audi alterant principle, it seems, makes notice something
of a security blanket. However, this may be too simplistic an explanation. It
seems reasonable that judges and masters are likely to turn their minds to the
fact that ex pane orders are often set aside, whether or not the lack of notice is
a significant issue. Thus, in the interest of preserving scarce judicial resources,
these decision-makers may look to the facts for anything which might indicate
that the responding party may at some point object to not having had notice,
whether or not such a potential objection would normally defeat the ability of
the moving party to proceed ex pane; and, having found such indicia, simply
ask counsel for notice on an informal basis. To be sure, when directions of this
sort are given, judges are not always speaking to the moving party providing
formal notice, but simply that the potentially affected party be apprised in some
way.64 This admitted speculation may provide some partial explanation for such
otherwise opaque statements as, "[t]he practice of the Court is to require a party
seeking an ex pane order to inform opposing counsel or the party, in some
manner, of the impending motion."65
Is there, then, a rule of thumb to be applied when approaching the possibility of going the ex pane route? In light of the law and practice that has been
canvassed above, and without attempting to cover every situation, the following
inquiries recommend themselves:
a)

Ascertain whether an ex pane hearing is formally available for the
anticipated application. This will involve consideration of the procedural rule or enactment in question, and in particular any case law
or practice that is on point;

b) If so, evaluate the facts which are motivating an ex pane move to
determine whether they support it—would notice defeat the purpose
of the application? Is it unnecessary, impossible or highly impracticable that notice be given? Is the matter urgent in some other way,
63 D. Peppiatt, R. Linton, Practice on Motions and References (Toronto: Butterworths, 1988)
at 34, though to be true to the source the authors are speaking simply to situations where
"it appears to the master that it is not appropriate to make an order without notice,"
possibly not reflecting the nuance I am suggesting here.
64 Robert Half Canada Inc. v. Jeewan, supra note 46 at para. 38. And see Synergy Credit
Union Ltd. v. Husch, 2008 SKQB 275 (Q.B.).
65 Clark v. Simmonds (1998), 171 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 70 (T.D.) at para. 16.

458 /Annual Review of Civil Litigation
i.e., is there some concern for personal safety or destruction of property?
c)

If the other parties are represented, informal and/or short notice
should usually be given in any event, unless refraining to do so can
be significantly justified under one of the factors in (b), above;

d) If the other parties are unrepresented and formal notice is unnecessary
or impracticable (e.g., an application for default judgment), consider
providing informal notice by way of a telephone call or letter.
Some of these suggestions may go against the grain, to some extent; after
all, if one is anticipating getting a default judgment which would make the
client happy, why throw up an obstacle that might interfere? This is a reasonable
standpoint, particularly in an adversarial system, but the lawyer in such situations is always taking the calculated risk that the other side will not later move
to set aside the ex pane order. If this does occur, having given notice can go a
long way towards convincing the court to do the right thing.

IV. WHAT SHOULD COUNSEL DO (AND NOT DO) ON
AN EX PARTE MOTION?
If determination of when ex pane proceedings should and should not be
available is the first level of screening that controls this exception to the audi
alterant principle, then the duties imposed by the law upon litigants in how they
conduct themselves in the ex pane setting is the second level. As will be seen,
it is even more rigorous than the first, with the added possibility of sanctions
upon both client and counsel when the applicable standards are not met. This
section will survey these obligations, with an eye to providing some guidance
based on examples (and cautionary tales) from the case law. As the Federal
Court of Appeal noted, there is no significant distinction between the duties on
counsel in ex pane injunction applications and those in any other kind of ex
pane proceeding,66 and no attempt will be made to differentiate these settings
here except where useful for illustration purposes.
By way of a preliminary remark, part of my approach to teaching Civil
Procedure is, to use the old saw, attempting to develop the ability of the students
to "think like lawyers," or more specifically to think like litigators. Despite the
fact that the modern rationale behind procedural regimes is to drive parties
66 TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Property Fund of Ukraine, [2005] 3 F.C.R. I l l , additional
reasons at 2005 FCA 231, leave to appeal allowed (2005), [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 301,2005
CarswellNat 2302, notice of discontinuance filed 4 January 2006, at para. 65, citing
Landhurst Leasing Pic v. Marcq (1997), [1997] E.W.J. No. 1490, [1998] I.L.Pr. 822
(C.A.) at p. 15 and Canadian Paraplegic, supra note 1 at para. 18.
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towards settlement, when using the rules the litigator must nonetheless fulfill
his/her duty of resolute advocacy on behalf of the client. Thus, in guiding the
students in how they should approach procedural questions that may arise during
a case, I tell them that the starting point to answering many questions is "it's an
adversarial system."
When dealing with exparte matters, however, this is often not the answer;
at least, on a procedural level, it is not as effective a guidepost as it might be in
the inter partes setting. Rather, when a party is alone before a judge the tension
between the lawyer's duty to client and his/her duty as an officer of the court
is brought into sharper relief than is normally the case. This requires counsel to
walk a very narrow line and delicately balance the obligations at play.
1. The Obligation: "Full and Frank Disclosure"
As to the specific contents of the obligations imposed by law in exparte
matters, one can hardly do better than the dictum of Justice Green set out at the
beginning of this paper:67 the general obligation is to observe "the utmost good
faith," and the specific obligation is "full and frank disclosure of all material
facts known to the applicant or counsel that could reasonably be expected to
have a bearing on the outcome of the application." The leading expression of
these duties, however, is probably the frequently-cited statements by Justice
Sharpe in United States v. Friedland,™ which are worth setting out fully: 69
It is a well established principle of our law that a party who seeks the extraordinary
relief of an ex parte injunction must make full and frank disclosure of the case.
The rationale for this rule is obvious. The Judge hearing an ex parte motion and
the absent party are literally at the mercy of the party seeking injunctive relief.
The ordinary checks and balances of the adversary system are not operative. The
opposite party is deprived of the opportunity to challenge the factual and legal
contentions advanced by the moving party in support of the injunction. The
situation is rife with the danger that an injustice will be done to the absent party.
As a British Columbia judge noted recently:
There is no situation more fraught with potential injustice and abuse of the
Court's powers than an application for an ex parte injunction.

67 Drawn from Canadian Paraplegic, supra note 1 at para. 18.
68 Above, note 15, which can also be found in His Lordship's text, supra note 44 at para.
2.40. For a recent illustrative decision, see Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v.
Labatt Brewing Co., 2008 FC 59.
69 Ibid, at paras. 26-27, citation omitted. See also Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2002]
4 S.C.R. 3, at para. 27.

460 / Annual Review of Civil Litigation
For that reason, the law imposes an exceptional duty on the party who seeks ex
parte relief. That party is not entitled to present only its side of the case in the
best possible light, as it would if the other side were present. Rather, it is incumbent
on the moving party to make a balanced presentation of the facts in law. The
moving party must state its own case fairly and must inform the Court of any
points of fact or law known to it which favour the other side. The duty of full and
frank disclosure is required to mitigate the obvious risk of injustice inherent in
any situation where a Judge is asked to grant an order without hearing from the
other side.

It is worth noting that the duty of full and frank disclosure attaches both
to the moving party, as litigant, and separately to counsel him/herself as a
function of ethical obligations.70 The various Rules of Professional Conduct
enumerate specifically the ethical obligations in ex parte matters. The CBA's
Code of Professional Conduct, for example, provides in Chapter IX, Rule 17,
"Role in Adversary Proceedings":
. . . the lawyer's function as advocate is openly and necessarily partisan. Accordingly, the lawyer is not obliged (save as required by law or under paragraphs 2(h)
or 8 above) to assist an adversary or advance matters derogatory to the client's
case. When opposing interests are not represented, for example in ex parte or
uncontested matters, or in other situations where the full proof and argument
inherent in the adversary system cannot be obtained, the lawyer must take particular care to be accurate, candid and comprehensive in presenting the client's case
so as to ensure that the court is not misled."

Other codes appear to impose an even higher standard. The American
Bar Association's "Model Rules of Professional Conduct,"72 for example, state
(at Rule 3.3(d)): "In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal
of all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make
an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse." The question that
arises is the extent to which the duty is one of disclosing adverse facts, as
explicitly set out in the ABA model. Provincial codes vary; some, like Alberta,73
reflect the ABA wording, while others such as Ontario74 and Nova Scotia75
contain the CBA wording.
The conflict is more apparent than real, however, because of the reference
in the CBA wording to advancing matters "derogatory" to the client's case "as
70 Accord, Block et al., supra note 25, at 241. See generally G. MacKenzie, Lawyers and
Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Discipline, looseleaf (Toronto: ThomsonCarswell), updated to Release 1 (2008) at §4.21.
71 Available online at <www.cba.org>.
72 Available online at <www.abanet.org>.
73 Alberta Code of Professional Conduct, chapter 10, rule 8.
74 Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4.01(1).
75 Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct Handbook, Rule 14, commentary 14.11.
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required by law." As Sharpe J. indicated in Friedland, quoted above, the duty
to be candid and comprehensive clearly anticipates that counsel should put
forward facts which may favour the other side, but which are required for the
court to fully appreciate the situation. This is what distinguishes the ex pane
proceeding significantly from normal adversarial processes, and justifies Justice
Green's description of it as a "super-added duty,"76 as well as Justice Philp's
admonition to counsel to err on the side of "excessive disclosure."77 It has also
been suggested that the duty of full and frank disclosure is of a heightened
nature (if such is possible) where the litigant is a government agency, particularly those dealing with basic liberty issues.78
2. How Full, How Frank?
"Although the moving party is not required to argue the defendant's case
in the defendant's absence, it is incumbent on the applicant to make a balanced
presentation of all material facts and law."79 This summarizing statement speaks
to the balance that must be struck. But how is the applicant to be sure that it
knows what all of the "material" facts are, so as not to be caught out for nondisclosure? As Azevedo's excellent article indicates, there is some division in
the case law as to how materiality is properly assessed in ex. pane matters. On
one line of authority, the threshold for relevance is quite low, similar to the
"semblance of relevancy" test employed for determining whether facts should
be disclosed in discovery.80 The test, it is said, is objective, and if a fact appears
to be at all relevant it should be placed before the court for the judge's determination of its materiality.81 As Berryman puts it, "[m]ateriality is for the court
to determine, not the plaintiffs legal advisers."82 Another line of authority
suggests that the material facts are limited to those which might actually affect
the outcome of the application.83 Certainly Justice Sharpe tells us that ex. pane
injunction orders, at least, should not be set aside "on account of mere imper-

76 Canadian Paraplegic, supra note 1 at para. 18.
77 Pulse Microsystems Ltd. v. SafeSoft Systems Inc. (1996), 134 D.L.R. (4th) 701 (Man.
C.A.), at 709, citing Columbia Picture Industries Inc. v. Robinson (1985), [1986] 3 All
E.R. 338 (Ch. Div.) at 372.
78 See Batiuk, supra note 35 at paras. 32-33.
79 Azevedo, supra note 16 at 500, citing LeMay v. Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. (1995),
103 Man. R. (2d) 302 (Q.B.) at p. 305, as well as Friedland, supra note 15 at para. 27.
80 Ibid, at 501.
81 Ibid, at 500-501, citing Bardeau Ltd. v. Crown Food Service Equipment Ltd. (1982), 38
O.K. (2d) 411 (H.C.); see also Matheson, supra note 37.
82 J. Berryman, The Law of Equitable Remedies (Toronto: Irwin, 2000) at 34.
83 Azevedo, supra note 16 at 502, citing Rust Check Canada Inc. v. Buchowski (1994), 58
C.P.R. (3d) 324 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
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fections in the affidavits or because inconsequential facts have not been disclosed."84
Resort to first principles may provide some general guidance. In any
proceeding, evidence is only admissible if it is relevant to a material issue—that
is, if it has some tendency to prove a fact which is actually at play between the
litigants. The material issues in an ex parte proceeding will, of course, vary
with the case, but will encompass whatever findings the applicant is seeking to
have the court make I'M the motion itself, plus any other issue that relates to how
those findings will affect the rights of the absent party. It may be helpful for the
applicant to step out of its advocacy role for a moment and consider the position
of the judge, the fact-finder: If you were impartial as to the outcome, what
would you want to know in order to make the decision, bearing in mind the
necessity of having a factual record that is complete without being overbroad?
The entire case need and should not be fought on the back of one interlocutory
application, but the court should have as complete a version as is reasonably
possible (bearing in mind urgency and short timelines) of the facts that are
actually relevant to the material issues it must decide. Practically, erring on the
side of a generous view of materiality is likely to be wise in most cases.
It is relatively clear that the obligation to be candid also places an onus
on the applicant to make appropriate inquiries as to material facts, i.e., "a due
diligence requirement."85 If a material fact would have been obtainable through
the exercise of reasonable diligence and effort, then the court is unlikely to
accept a submission that the applicant was not aware of itss and may make a
finding of material non-disclosure. What "reasonable" diligence and effort
means will vary on the facts of the case and will be shaped by "(a) the nature
of the applicant's case, (b) the probable effect on the defendant if the order is
granted, and (c) the degree of legitimate urgency at the time of making inquiries.""7 This general duty may be supplemented by specific requirements imposed
under the procedural provisions which underpin the application. For example,
in the Federal Court an application to enforce a foreign judgment must be
supported by an affidavit which states that "having made careful and full inquiries, the applicant knows of no impediment to registration, recognition or
enforcement of the foreign judgment."8"
The applicant must also ensure that the law is presented in a "balanced"
and "comprehensive" manner. As Justice Mason stated in Leahy, "[t]he required
disclosure extends to all material facts and law."89 This dovetails neatly with
84 Sharpe, supra note 44 at para. 2-45.
85 Azevedo, supra note 16 at 501.
86 Canadian Pacific Railway v. U.T.U., Local 144 (1970), 14 D.L.R. (3d) 497 (B.C. S.C.);
Mooney v. Orr (1994), 100 B.C.L.R. (2d) 335 (S.C.) at 342, additional reasons at (1994),
1 B.C.L.R. (3d) 150(S.C.).
87 Berryman, supra note 82 at 34.
88 Federal Court Rule 329(l)(g). See TMR Energy, supra note 66 at paras. 64-68.
89 Supra note 56 at para. 186.
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the general ethical obligation on counsel to ensure that all authoritative case
law is brought before the court, whether it supports or undermines their case,
but with the "super-added" factor that it is the applicant who is making all of
the legal argument. Moreover, it is important to ensure that the important points
of law and fact are specifically brought to the court's attention, and not just
buried somewhere in the applicant's materials, in order to properly discharge
the duty.90 This can be quite pressing in ex pane matters, where a combination
of urgency and volume of materials may mean that the judge may not be able
to prepare thoroughly.91
Beyond this general level, however, what constitutes "full and frank"
disclosure will be highly case-specific. It may be instructive to provide a short
list of "dos" and "don'ts" generated from case law on point:
i)

DO disclose to the court any situations where the law is unsettled. In
United States v. Vernec?2 the Court dissolved a Mareva injunction
which had been obtained by the American Federal Trade Commission against Canadians who were selling Canadian lottery tickets to
U.S. residents—in part because the FTC failed to disclose to the
motions judge that the actions of the defendants were not necessarily
illegal, that a case on point was currently on reference to the Supreme
Court of Canada, and that the defendants may have had a defence.
In Society of Lloyd's v. Van Snick,n the Court of Appeal found that
there had been material non-disclosure where counsel cited a case
before the Chambers judge as authority for granting their ex pane
application but did not disclose that the case was under appeal.

ii) DO disclose knowledge you have about any fact that may possibly
be beneficial to the other party, even if the matter appears to be
speculative or ineffective. In RBI Plastique Inc./RBI Plastic Inc. v.
Sport Maska Inc.''4 Sport Maska had received an ex pane order
appointing an interim receiver for RBI, which applied to set it aside.
RBI had held out publicly that it was about to receive financing from
the province to help extricate it from financial trouble, but Sport
Maska did not disclose this to the Registrar in Bankruptcy during the
ex pane application, on the basis that this financing was "unavailable,
expired or at best speculative and therefore not a relevant matter to
90 Matheson, supra note 37 at 4, fn. 18 and cases cited therein. And see Labatt 's, supra note
68.
91 See McGrath v. B.C. Schickedanz Homes Inc. (2000), [2000] O.J. No. 4161, 2000
CarswellOnt 3990 (S.C.J.) at para. 36.
92 (2003), [2003] O.J. No. 3863, 2003 CarswellOnt 3762 (S.C.J.), affirmed (2005), [2005]
O.J. No. 1165, 2005 CarswellOnt 1164 (Div. Ct.), additional reasons at (2005), [2005]
O.J. No. 2585, 2005 CarswellOnt 3274 (Div. Ct.).
93 Supra note 31.
94 (2005), (sub nom. RBI Plastic Inc. (Bankrupt), Re) 289 N.B.R. (2d) 192 (Q.B.).
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the motion."95 The judge hearing the appeal of the order agreed that
the fact was "speculative at best" and held that it was not one that
would have had any bearing on the outcome—but nonetheless rebuked Sport Maska for not disclosing the fact to the Registrar.96 The
lesson may be to disclose even highly suspect facts which may be
beneficial to the other side, but to dispense with them in argument.
This will provide the double bonus of strengthening the applicant's
case and signaling counsel's willingness to be "candid and comprehensive."
iii) DO disclose any other litigation between the parties. In Netbored
Inc. v. Avery Holdings Inc.,97 Netbored applied for and received an
Anton Filler order against Avery, but did not disclose that Avery had
already begun a tort action against Netbored in the Ontario Superior
Court. On a review, Justice Hughes found that Netbored had not been
properly candid on the exparte application and vacated the order. In
Havana House Cigar & Tobacco Merchants Ltd. v. Jane Doe,9Kthe
plaintiffs applied for and received a John Doe order and executed it
against 97 parties, but failed to disclose on the application that previous applications for interlocutory judgments against five of the 97
had failed. The Court refused to issue interlocutory injunctions
against the five and ordered return of the seized materials and compensation.
iv) DON'T mis-state foreign law that is relevant to the application. In
United States v. Friedland," the plaintiffs lead U.S. counsel was put
forward as an expert on U.S. law for the application. She was later
compelled to disclose an in-house memo on the law relating to the
matter, which showed that she had materially mis-represented this
law in her evidence on the exparte application. The plaintiff had also
failed to disclose a shift in their theory of Friedland's legal liability
under U.S. law, as well as facts relating to a share transfer which, if
disclosed, might have led to the application being made inter partes.lm
v) DON'T attempt to mislead the court about what the actual effect of
the exparte order will be. In TMR Energy Ltd.m the applicant had
95 Ibid. at para. 11.
96 Ibid, at para. 12.
97 (2005), [2005] F.C.J. No. 1723,2005 CarswellNat3289(F.C). SeeJ. Cotter and T. James,
"Anton Filler orders come under intense scrutiny by Federal Court" (2005) The Lawyer's
Weekly, Vol. 25, No. 28 (November 25, 2005).
98 (1999), ] C.P.R. (4th) 521 (Fed. T.D.).
99 Supra note 15.
100 See also Leahy, supra note 56 at para. 198.
101 Supra note 66.
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applied to enforce a foreign order against an entity called "State
Property Fund of Ukraine." The Court of Appeal found that TMR
had actually been planning to enforce the order against the State of
Ukraine, which would have engaged issues under the State Immunity
Act, but did not disclose this to the Prothonotary on the ex pane
application. It upheld the lower court's setting aside of the order. In
Fashion Box S.P.A. v. BLM Sales,102 the plaintiffs applied for a John
Doe order when they knew the identity of one of the merchandisers
they alleged were violating their trademark, and knew that the material the merchandiser was selling was genuine, but executed the
John Doe order regardless. The Court characterized the plaintiffs
evidence on the exparte application as "so misleading that one could
consider it to be almost deceitful."103
3. Sanctions
Where a court finds that a party has not made "full and frank disclosure"
on an exparte application, it is usually referred to as "material non-disclosure."
Extensive reference to the consequences of material non-disclosure has been
made above, but a quick re-cap may be useful:
a)

Setting aside the order, again, Justice Green has a most effective
summary: l04

Material mis-statements or non-disclosure on an ex parte application will justify
the court, on a subsequent review of the order, in setting aside the order for that
reason alone. This principle is one of long standing: Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus
(1886), 55 L.T. 802; Sturgeon v. Hooker (1847), 63 E.R. 1158; R. v. Kensington
Tax Commission [1917] 1 K.B. 486 (C.A.). The rationale is that the court, in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to control its process, is justified in dealing
with an abuse of its process and this is so regardless of whether the abuser might
in fact otherwise have had a good case on the merits.

b) Setting aside injunctions and Norwich orders: as Justice Sharpe has
written, "[fjailure to make full disclosure has been dealt with severely
and may result in the injunction being set aside."1"5 In FriedlandHis
Lordship held that the injunction should be set aside as of right, but
the latest version of his text indicates some division among the courts
as to whether discretion can and should be exercised in such situa102
103
104
105

(1996), 113 F.T.R. 305 (T.D.).
Ibid, at para. 8.
Canadian Paraplegic, supra note 1, at para. 22.
Sharpe, supra note 44 at para. 2.40. Regarding Friedland, Justice Sharpe remarks:
"However, inflexible application of this rule is to be avoided and failure to make full
disclosure is not invariably fatal."
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tions.106 However, this "big stick" remedy is certainly always available in sufficiently egregious circumstances.107 Norwich orders can
be similarly vacated, though whether to do so is open to the court's
discretion;108 and the case is the same with John Doe orders, which
can be fully or partially vacated.109
c)

Costs: awards of costs are another manner by which the courts will
sanction parties who commit material non-disclosure. Normally costs
will follow the event, and any party who is successful in having an
ex parte order set aside will expect either party-and-party costs of
the application, or that the deficient ex pane application will be taken
into account in the award of costs after trial.!10 In Pulse Microsystems
Ltd.,111 in vacating an Anton Filler order the Court of Appeal awarded
costs of the application on a solicitor-and-client basis, ".. .to compensate the defendants... [and] serve as a penalty to the plaintiffs
for their failure to make full and frank disclosure... and as a reminder
to other plaintiffs of the complete candour which must accompany
such an application."112 Costs may even be awarded against a public
agency in appropriate circumstances.11-1

d) Damages: in an appropriate case, damages can be awarded to the
party against whom the ex parte order issued. In Pulse Microsystems
Ltd.,"4 the defendant was compensated for damage to its property
that occurred during the execution of the Anton Filler order. In Royal
Bank v. W. Got & Associates Electric Ltd.,115 the Supreme Court of
Canada affirmed an award of $100,000 in punitive damages at trial
against the bank, which had filed a misleading affidavit during an
interlocutory ex parte application earlier in the case—agreeing with
the trial judge that this conduct had "seriously affrontfed] the administration of justice."116
e)
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

113
114
115
116

Perjury: it has been suggested that the "most serious... consequence

Ibid, at para. 2.40-2.50. See also Azevedo, supra note 16, and Berryman, supra note 82.
See Netbored, supra note 97.
See Block et al., supra note 25 at 241, esp. n. 71 and cases cited therein.
Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Bernstein (1982), 67 C.P.R. (2d) 112 (Fed. T.D.).
E.g., Leahy, supra note 56.
Supra note 77.
Ibid, at 715. Justice Sharpe cited this case in making a similar order in Friedland, supra
note 15 at paras. 205-206. See also United States v. Yemec (2007), 85 O.R. (3d) 751
(Div. Ct.), additional reasons at (2007), 2007 CarswellOnt 5268 (Div. Ct.); Canada
Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canadian Commercial Bank (\, 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 322
(Q.B.).
Batiuk, supra note 35 at para. 42.
Supra note 77.
[1999]3S.C.R.408.
Ibid, at para. 28.
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of a breach of the duty of full and frank disclosure is a charge of
perjury.""7 This would be an extremely high threshold to meet, as
the affidavit would essentially have to go beyond non-disclosure and
engage the affiant in actual falsehood. Nonetheless, it is a potential
sanction against a party, and suborning perjury would violate the
lawyer's ethical obligations.
4. How Do You Save Your Order?
Where a litigant must defend a review of, or application to set aside, an
ex pane order, a variation on the archetypal defence strategy of "deny, deny,
deny" may actually come in handy. Essentially, one should take the various
factors outlined above, work backwards, and deny: deny that there was any
material misrepresentation; or in the alternative deny that any misrepresentation
that did occur had any effect on the outcome of the ex pane motion.
Obviously, the best line of defence is to convince the reviewing judge
that the factual record put before the court on the ex pane application was as
"candid and comprehensive" as it needed to be for the specific purpose of the
application. One should be alert for attempts by the opposing party to obfuscate
by adducing facts that are relevant to the case at large but were not material to
the application itself. It may also be helpful to emphasize any time pressure or
other urgency that existed at the time of the application, and advocate against
any weight being given to "mere imperfections in the affidavits or ... inconsequential facts .. .""*
The real battle begins if the reviewing judge finds that a particular undisclosed fact was at least nominally material. One option is to suggest that the
lack of evidence on a point "can be compensated by corroborative evidence""9
that is and was available to the court. Another line of argument is that the
applicant simply did not have knowledge of the fact, though as noted above,
this argument requires a demonstration that the applicant was duly diligent in
putting together its evidence for the ex, pane hearing. Most effective is the
argument that the undisclosed evidence would not have made any difference to
the ex parte order that ultimately issued,120 though as discussed above this may
be subject to some uncertainty in injunction cases. Finally, the appropriate case
may float an argument that the defendant has not come to court with "clean
hands," and that this should weigh against rescinding the order.121
117 Block et al., supra note 25 at 241.
118 Coca-Cola Ltd. v. Pardhan (2003), 23 C.P.R. (4th) 173 (Fed. C.A.) at para. 26, quoting
Sharpe, supra note 44.
119 Drapeau and Drapeau, supra note 18 at 557.
120 E.g., RBI Plastic, supra note 94.
121 E.g., Wellcome Foundation Ltd. v. Apotex Inc. (1990), 32 C.P.R. (3d) 350 (Fed. T.D.),
amended (1990), 34 C.P.R. (3d) 191 (Fed. T.D.); Adobe Systems Inc. v. KLJ Computer
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V. CONCLUSION
Like the Spanish Inquisition, the enforcement of an ex parte order will
inevitably take a litigant by surprise. The parallels, while not strikingly similar,
are not tenuous either; in both cases, the compulsory power of the state is
brought to bear against an individual without his/her knowledge that the particular legal process has been initiated; in both, evidence is given against a party
in a manner that, while not necessarily secretive (though ex parte hearings are
sometimes held in camera), do not allow the essential tools of the adversarial
system to be operative. No cross-examination of the accuser, no testing of the
evidence.
Unlike the Spanish Inquisition, however, the party against whom an ex
parte order issues will not expire as a result of the execution of that order, and
nearly always has the opportunity to have the court set it aside. As has been
surveyed here, the courts are protective of parties who are not heard, and
remedies can involve both substantive and costs penalties for the moving party,
as well as professional discomfort for his/her counsel. Any litigator seeking ex
parte relief is well-advised to proceed carefully.

Solutions Inc. (1999), 1 C.P.R. (4th) 177 (Fed. T.D.). See also Drapeau and Drapeau,
supra note 18 at 557-558.
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APPENDIX: EXPARTE "BLANKET" PROVISIONS
COMPARED122
BC
[52(12.1)]

AB
[387(1)]

Impracticable

Unnecessary

Unnecessary

Serious
mischief

Urgency

NB
[37.04]

Impracticable
Unnecessary
Serious consequences

SK
[441(3)]

Serious
mischief

Serious
consequences
NS
[5.02 and 22.03]

Appropriate
Sufficient gravity

MB
[37.06(2)qc&
(3)]

ON
[37.07]
(same as PEI)

Impracticable

Unnecessary

Unnecessary

Impracticable

FC
[362(2)]

Urgency

Serious
consequences

PEI
[37.07]
(same as ON)

Impracticable
Unnecessary
Serious consequences

NL
[29.04]

Unnecessary
Serious mischief

122 Prepared by Gillian MacNeil and updated to 2009 by Jim Janson.

NWT

[398]
Unnecessary
Serious mischief
or injustice

